PRACTICE OF LAW

December 22, 2008

Injured Employee Entitled to Trust Fund Benefits for Income From Multiple Jobs Says Massachusetts Supreme Court

by Boston Lawyer

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has determined that the Workers’ Compensation Trust Fund must pay benefits to an employee of a tree cutting company who failed to obtained workers’ compensation insurance based on the employee’s total earnings, including wages earned from a second job with an insured employer.

The thirty-three (33) year old worker suffered a severe injury in September, 2001, when a tree limb fell onto him, severing his spinal column and leaving him a quadriplegic. and totally disabled. The tree service had violated the Workers’ Compensation Act, G.L. c. 152, s. 25A, by not carrying workers’ compensation insurance. The worker earned most of his income from a second job with another company, which was properly insured, but because the injury occurred while he was working for an uninsured employer, the trust fund was required to pay all of his benefits.

Following the accident, the worker filed for workman’s compensation benefits, seeking two thirds of his average weekly wage from both jobs because he was totally and permanently disabled. The Trust fund objected and an administrative judge thereafter issued an order awarding benefits from the date of his injury calculated by considering only his average weekly wage from the uninsured employer.

Both parties appealed, and at a de novo hearing before the same judge, but with a stipulation that the worker was permanently and totally disabled. This time the judge ruled that the trust fund must pay permanent total incapacity benefits based on the worker’s average weekly wage from both employers.

December 16, 2008

First Circuit Court of Appeals Affirms Dismissal of Sick Driver’s Civil Rights Claim against Police Officers and Town for Alleged Improper Arrest

by Boston Lawyer

La Frenier v. Town of Townsend et al.
U.S. Court of Appeals, 1st Cir. 07-1644

The U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit, has upheld a summary judgment entered against an individual who sued the Town of Townsend and two of its police officers for civil rights violations based on an arrest, which took place in June, 2001. The Plaintiff was the operator of a motor vehicle who had pulled over to the side of the road, disoriented, confused and physically ill. He was taking medications at the time. The police attempted to remove him from the vehicle at which time he resisted, was restrained and thereafter arrested for assault and battery, resisting arrest and disorderly conduct. All charges were all ultimately dismissed or resulted in acquittals.

handcuffs The driver then filed claims against the arresting officers and the town for violation of state and federal statutes, including civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. s. 1983. He sued the town for negligent supervision, and the police officers for false arrest, excessive force and failing to provide medical assistance.

The lower court granted summary judgment on the basis that the undisputed facts, as presented to the court, showed that the officers had probable cause to make the arrest based on the plaintiffs conduct at the time, and had no motive to mistreat or deny him medical treatment.

The court principally relied on the fact that the Plaintiff had failed to present any affirmative evidence to contradict the statements of the Defendants, and that absent such evidence, judgment for Defendants was the appropriate remedy. The Plaintiff maintained that the police were not credible and that questions of creditability created an issue for the jury and warranted denial of summary judgment.

November 23, 2008

Massachusetts SJC Waives Law School Requirement For Bar Admission

by Boston Lawyer

MITCHELL vs. BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS , SJC-10157.
Decided November 20, 2008.

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has carved out an exception to the longstanding rule that only graduates from American Bar Association (“ABA”) accredited law schools may sit for the bar exam to gain admission to the bar. The Court used its equitable powers to waive a particular requirement of a court rule concerning admission to the bar, and more specifically the law school accreditation requirement set out in S.J.C. Rule 3:01, § 3.3, that an applicant have graduated from a law school accredited by the ABA.

The applicant had argued that by requiring graduation from an ABA-approved law school in order to sit for the Massachusetts bar examination, S.J.C. Rule 3:01 violated the equal protection guarantees of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The Court did not reach the constitutional arguments, but decided the case on other grounds.